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In this paper, we focus our attention on market and institutional constrains regarding 
real estate investments. In the contemporary globalized economy, real estate markets 
throughout the world currently attract a range of international investors, lenders, 
occupiers and developers, seeking cross-border opportunities in search of optimal 
investment returns. It is also stated that real estate markets can be the key for the 
emerging economies to raise the finances to start businesses (Jones Lang LaSalle, 
2004). Greece is an emerging real estate market, where international real estate 
investors have not usually been particularly active. Markets are mainly organized by the 
State and government through institutional frameworks and practices. Over the last few 
years, the State has aimed at promoting the development of real estate markets and at 
encouraging foreign investments. However, despite the State’s professed policy in 
favour of real estate market development, few efforts have been made to improve real 
estate market transparency, while foreign investments in real estate remain limited to 
date. Transparency is also catalytic in long-term change in real estate practices. A 
quoted public sector must act as the driving force for improvements in transparency. 
According to Keogh and D’Arcy (1999), market efficiency implies a State in which all 
economically viable solutions have been implemented. In this work, we pay attention on 
the facets of the real estate market low transparency in Greece, as well as constrains it 
imposes in investments. 
 
The public sector and real estate market transparency are structural factors of the 
market, and highly interdependent. In this paper, we explore the role of the public sector 
in real estate market transparency and what effects it has had on tourism investments in 
Greece. Tourism is considered by the Greek State as the most promising economic 
sector of the country. Real estate development is one of the prerequisites for the 
increase in the supply of tourism infrastructure, even if –it must be said– the nature of 
tourism imposes the regulation of supply in face of an extremely volatile international 
demand and international Tour Operator’s practices. However, the main objective of the 
state is to upgrade tourism. Tourism Development Co (TD Co) is a State-owned 
company with the mission of managing and developing public real estate assets in areas 
  1of tourist interest. TD Co is a relevant case to study: it is a state-owned company 




Managing tourism real estate assets 
 
Greek State disposes an extremely large portfolio of real estate assets, managed by 
about 7.000 public authorities. Greek National Tourism Organization (GNTO) is one of 
the most important owners of valuable tourist properties.  By the end of 1990s the 
Organization was looked into the mobilization of its large and diversified portfolio in 
real estate assets. The first state-owned company that has undertaken to manage and 
develop the numerous assets owned by GNTO was initially founded in 1998 (L. 
2636/1998). In 2000 it took the name of Hellenic Tourist Properties S.A. (L. 
2837/2000), while in 2004 the company was renamed at Tourism Development Co (L. 
3270/2004). The fundamental goals of the Company are generally in accordance with 
those laid down by National Tourism Policy, being namely: to diversify the Greek 
Tourism Product, to upgrade the quality of services provided in the tourism sector, to 
sustain and make investments competitive, to gauge the social and economic impact of 
the investments made, to develop environmentally sustainable tourism, to increase 
investment activity in neighbouring areas of the properties (Hellenic Tourist Properties, 
2001). 
 
Properties managed by the company are of both significant tourist interest and 
potentially significant financial value, estimated at € 800,000,000 by the middle of the 
year 2003, when the portfolio was evaluated with reference to its capitalization at the 
Athens Stock Exchange Market. The assets under TD Co management currently include 
operating – or obsolete – business units and undeveloped land in prime tourism 
locations in the country, namely: More than 300 land plots totalling approximately 
7,300 hectares, 40 hotels around the country, 6 yacht and pleasure boat marinas, 2 
Casinos, Greece’s biggest winter sports/ski resort, 9 thermal springs resorts, 11 camp 
sites, etc. 
 
TD Co aims at managing and developing assets by mobilizing both international and 
national funds, and converting it into a company for administrating subsidiary 
companies and rental contracts. This public sector company initially adopted innovative 
financing techniques such as Public-Private Partnership schemes to attract international 
capital, real estate and development expertise. Mizuho Corporate Advisory Co Ltd, a 
wholly owned a subsidiary of FUJI Bank associated with local technical consultants, is 
the financial adviser and Overall Project Manager of TD Co. The privatization process 
of any asset –except leases– is submitted for approval to the Ministerial Privatization 
Committee, which possesses their own financial and technical advisers. Results are 
rather poor to date, as only few following projects have been completed. 
▪  2001 saw the beginning of the privatization of “Mont Parnes”, the sole operating 
casino in Attica, there was an international invitation to tender for transferring 51% of 
the subsidiary company of TD Co, which managed it, and the management of the casino 
to a private investor. The tendering was completed at the end of 2002 when the contract 
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the Hyatt Regency was signed. The contract was ratified by the Greek Parliament by 
law in 2003. 
▪  Also in 2001, international invitation to tender were extended for the development of 
the Attica’s two marinas. These tenders were completed in 2002 with the signing of the 
relevant contracts. In the new joint ventures, in the companies that were created, TD 
owned 25% of the company shares. 
▪  In 2003, another attempt for privatization was made, concerning the 150-hectare golf 
course on the island of Rhodes. The development program included the modernization 
of the 18-hole golf course, the construction of high-class hotels with a capacity of 1,000 
beds, and 250 tourist residencies. Two consortiums of domestic and foreign enterprises 
were dealt in. One of the two consortiums pulled out and the property was awarded to 
the Rhodes Riviera Hotel Estate and Golf Development, but the contract was never 
signed. The proposed investment amount came to €93m. Following the Greek national 
elections in 2004, the new government decided to cancel the original tender and issue a 
new invitation to tender. Till today, this new invitation to tender has not been issued. 
The political decision for cancelling the original tender had the following significant 
outcome: investors lost faith in TD Co and consequently in real estate development 
procedures. 
 
A few months following the national parliamentary elections in 2004, TD Co was 
preparing to floater on the Athens Stock Exchange. Its floatation was cancelled. The 
two reasons that were publicized most were: a) the ethics of granting private individuals 
the management of public property mainly acquired by expropriations with public 
funds; b) illegal actions concerning TD Co’s management of GNTO properties. 
 
 
Facets of the Greek real estate market low transparency 
 
A purely transparent real estate market is completely open and clearly organized, 
operates in a legal and regulatory framework characterized by a consistent approach to 
the enforcement of published rules and planning regulations, and respects private 
property rights. More, property market transaction and information costs are relatively 
low. Greek real estate market is low transparent. According to Jones Lang LaSalle Real 
Estate Transparency Index (2004), Greece is on the 32th range between 51 countries, 
after all EU countries
1. 
 
● The security of legal title and the enforceability of property rights are critical issues 
for investors, lenders, developers and occupiers. Where there is no security of title or 
where enforceability of contract is not ensured consistently, domestic and international 
investors are not always willing to invest. The protection of property rights is 
commonly one of the most important roles of the State. Land tenure security and 
investment linkage is a fundamental one which underlies property rights in land (Feder 
& Nishio, 1998). A land registration system defines the nature and content of rights in 
land, provides legal protection and guarantees these rights, the landowner or a purchaser 
of land. In Greece, there is no safe land registration system, such as a Cadastre, and 
property rights are not absolutely secure, neither for private properties, nor for public 
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country started in mid-1990s, but the project was suspended in early 2000s, because of 
money abuse scandals. 
 
Property rights security was the first problem that TD Co encountered. Properties it 
manages were acquired three decades ago or more by the GNTO, through 
expropriations or purchases. Some of the properties were state-owned land that was 
ceded to the Organization, thus becoming “State-owned Tourist Land” belonging to the 
GNTO. In some cases, all of the above three procedures were used for the acquisition of 
hundreds of small land plots that formed only one big estate. In many cases, land estates 
were not developed and remain unused until today. Inefficient protection and 
management of GNTO’s properties has resulted in major problems, which include: 
  Parts of almost any unused land estate were trespassed; 
  State-owned Tourist Land plots were never transcribed to the Land 
Registries. That is why, while land plots had already been ceded to the 
GNTO, they may have been ceded for a second time to another organisation, 
or even sold to physical persons; 
  As mentioned above, most of the estates were acquired through the 
expropriation process. According to Greek Law (L. 797/1971) and 
jurisprudence, expropriated land ought to be used accordingly to the purpose 
of the expropriation in a determined period of time. Otherwise, land may be 
restituted to its former owner. In 2005, there were many land plots that were 
claimed or restituted to their initial owners, after the completion drawn-out 
legal proceedings and State Council decisions. 
 
● Regulatory burdens may represent an area of dissatisfaction for investors, for 
contradictory reasons. Perceived over-regulation can be just as great a challenge for 
developers and investors as perceived under-regulation (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2004). 
Regulatory burdens comprise both the tax burden and the burden of planning and 
building regulations. The degree to which there are clear, published codes that are 
applied with fairness and consistency are of major importance. Although it is true that 
few countries are highly transparent in this respect, planning regulations regarding 
tourism investments in Greece are extremely complicated and inadequate. The main 
problem of tourism planning in Greece, which particularly affects large land estates 
development, is conflicts raised between different specific planning Laws and general 
planning regulations applied in the country. The following case is relevant: 
 
In order to facilitate tourism development of private or GNTO’s land estates, Law Nr 
2160 came into effect in 1993. According to this Law, particular building and planning 
regulations were applied for the GNTO’s properties, aiming at promoting their 
sustainable development. However, no investment was made. In 2003, Law Nr 3105 
and Presidential decree Nr 250 came into effect, whose provisions were requested of the 
Government by TD Co, in order to make corrections on the provisions of L.2160/1993 
and to facilitate development and privatization of the large estates, both of public and 
private ownership. As a state-owned company, TD Co possesses the privilege of direct 
access to the Government. Among many legal problems that arose, despite the 
consecutive institutional arrangements, we mention the following example: It is not 
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golf course, spa and hotels, may be sold. This is a very important rule for investors, as 
early sales of second homes will decrease risks associated with hotel investments and 
other resort facilities. This regulatory problem has not yet been resolved. Thus, 
investments in tourism resorts remain risky and not particularly attractive for some real 
estate developers. 
 
In fact, the main problem is that legal procedures in Greece are extremely fragmented, 
and they do not globally consider property development as tourism products. In this 
way, they do not come to embrace all critical aspects of the property development 
process. Although cultural and physical environment protection must be a prerequisite 
to any tourism real estate development, regulations concerning forestry, archaeological 
or environmental issues must be clearly defined. In Greece, these regulations are not 
spatially specified, in the sense that usually, when a land plot is purchased, its 
development perspectives are not always clear and guaranteed. Many of TD Co’s land 
estates around the country, such big estates in privileged sites in the peninsula of 
Chalkidiki in the Northern Greece, or the island of Crete, may not be developed because 
of environmental or archaeological regulations that are not precisely delineated, this 
provoking frictions with the relative Public Service Offices. Some major private 
investments are also pending for many years are the golf resorts in the administrative 
department of Messinia in the region of Peloponissos, in the area of Toplos Monastery 
in the department of Lasithi in Crete. Finally, obtaining building licences is an 
extremely difficult task, even for small projects, while bureaucracy corruption often 
plays a dissuasive role.  
 
● Generally, information regarding real assets that is economically relevant could 
include data regarding prices, vacancy rates, publication of firms’ accounts, etc. 
However, agents also need information relative to laws and regulations, governmental 
processes, public agencies, public procurement contracts, policy implementation and its 
consequences, etc, in order to make appropriate decisions. In this sense, governments 
play a key role when it comes to access to significant information. 
 
Inaccurate information is a major source of real estate market low transparency. In real 
estate markets, information efficiency implies that the distribution of market prices 
accurately reflects the spectrum of characteristics and risks associated with each asset 
(Gatzlaff & Tirtiroglu, 1995). Consequently, market efficiency means that market 
imperfections are rationally reflected in the market price. While this is the case in 
mature markets as some researches claim (Brown and Matysiak, 2000), this is not true 
in the Greek market. 
 
Where direct and indirect market performance indices have been available for a 
reasonable period of time, they make a major contribution to high transparency. Neither 
direct nor indirect real estate market performance indices are available in Greece (IMF, 
2005). Availability of market-fundamentals research for the main real estate sectors of 
the major areas of any country is an essential underpinning for a real estate market 
research. The availability of reliable performance indicators based on hard data is a key 
advantage in the eyes of investors. Performance indices based on national data provide 
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performance against peers. Real property is a spatial product. Information regarding real 
property must be geographically specialized (ADEF, 1992). General information and 
data that do not refer to the specific sub-markets and areas is not really relevant for 
investors.  
 
The lack of information leads to increased country risk premiums and consequently 
higher required local returns. Hotel real estate markets generally encounters a very 
weak-form of efficiency (Oak & Andrew, 2003) while it is recognised that in Europe 
reliable data are often difficult to obtain, rendering it necessary for hotel developers to 
research property market exhaustively (Nilssen et al, 2002). However, it is a fact that 
information on tourism and leisure market fundamentals in Greece is poor, or rather 
inexistent, when compared to the western European markets. Occupancy rates, market 
prices or market-based capitalization rates regarding hotel enterprises are completely 
unavailable. As far as secondary or tourism residences, statistical data are also 
unavailable. 
 
For some Greek investors, and for accustomed projects, lack of transparency may 
present an opportunity rather than a risk, and they do not welcome competitive 
investments from overseas, seeking to use their local market knowledge and experience 
to their advantage. Real estate properties are extremely heterogeneous, with numerous 
attributes that make it difficult and costly to delineate and measure (Barzel, 1989). Thus, 
information asymmetries arise from the fact that information available to one party of a 
contract is not the same as the information available to the other contracting party or 
competitor (Byamugisha, 1999). Krutzman (2004) fairly states that opacity can starve a 
project, because “Opaque systems create information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers and can add complexity and additional burden lender’s expectations of return 
on investment. Opacity also increases the ranges of possible projected cash flows from 
risky projects, resulting in lower risk-adjusted expected present values. This decreasing 
of expected discounted returns may ultimately result in the rejection of some projects 
that would be useful yet appear to be poor investments given opaque conditions.” Local 
construction and tourism management companies have acquired the local market 
experience, and they are not willing to communicate so as to contribute to market 
transparency. International investors, when they are interested in a specific project, need 
insightful advice from market professionals, not just general local market trends and 
sources of a product. It is almost impossible to find this information in Greece, where 
hotel and leisure sectors largely concern underground economy. Acquiring information 
is costly, and one cannot know the actual value of information before it is acquired.  
 
In some cases, lack of transparency may cause the country to be ignored by hotel and 
tourism investors when they draw up their international investment strategies. Although 
this is not always the case in Greece, it is certain that the country attracts some 
opportunistic investors who have high-leveraged return targets. However, there is an 
interest in new “integrated resort developments” this mainly concerns building and sale 
of secondary homes. This may be interpreted as an opportunistic interest, as second-
home residences are as risky as other tourist enterprises. There is no standardised 
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second-home properties. 
 
According to Gelos and Wei (2002), international funds prefer to hold more assets in 
markets that are transparent, and that the herding behaviour is less prevalent in countries 
with a higher transparency in comparison to those that are more opaque. Opacity also 
increases the ranges Even if it is not certain that this is the case, it is worth mentioning 
that FUJI Bank of Japan, which is the parent company of MIZUHO Co, the corporate 
adviser of TD Co, has never expressed –to date– an interest in financing the 
development projects that its subsidiary company carries out. 
 
● Low transparency is frequently considered to be synonymous with corruption. 
“Corruption is an outcome, a reflection of a country’s legal, economic, cultural and 
political institutions” (Svensson, 1998). According to the Corruption Transparency 
International Index 2005, Greece holds the 47th range between 158 countries
1. 
Government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the 
lack of development or slow growth of many economies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
According to Mauro (1995), corruption is a negative form of economic perspective. 
When examining corrupt public conduct, he states that it “discourages investment, 
limits economic growth, and alerts the composition of government spending, often to 
the detriment of future economic growth.” Development economics also suggests that 
property markets are the bedrock of economic development (Torstensson, 1994; 
Goldsmith A., 1995).  When corruption dominates in property markets, the private 
marginal product of capital invested decrease because of the bribes that have to be paid, 
lowering the investment rate. Even if there is not strong statistical evidence about the 
relationships between corruption and growth in many countries, case studies and micro 
evidence suggest that corruption severely retards development.  
 
OECD (2003) states that transparency is a key input to effective governance and 
development, while Stiglitz (2002) explains that just as information asymmetries allow 
company managers to follow policies that are convenient for their own interest rather 
than for the interest of shareholders, such asymmetries give public officials the 
possibility of choosing to pursue policies guided by their own interests rather than by 
the interests of citizens. Public Choice theories also suggest that “public managers, 
bureaucrats and politicians use their control of State-owned enterprises to further their 
own interests, rather than the state’s firm’s efficiency” (Shirley, 1999). The aim of this 
presentation is not to discuss rent-seeking theory, but it is important to mention - as an 
indicative example – a case of corruption in the public sector that seems it is not 
sufficiently taken into account. 
 
Indicative of bureaucrats’ practices is the matter of the privatisation of many public 
companies in Greece, in whose cancellation high-ranking officials of the companies 
have played a major role. The privatization of these companies would have imposed 
much higher management transparency, especially in the following fields: 
  In the selection of administrative staff; 
  In the handling of the companies financing; 
  In the methods and procedures followed in developing and managing activities. 
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Accusations were made for many of the companies, about inefficiencies in the 
management, and their real estate assets. During last two years, relative publications in 
the Greek press are abundant. Often these accusations are based on a wealth of detailed 
information or some facts on companies’ businesses situation and practices, much of 
which had leaked from the bureaucrats of the companies themselves. The privatization 
of the companies was not in the interest of certain officials, because in the event that 
they were privatized, they would not only lose their relative freedom of action, 
exclusively internally and without public control, issues that mattered very much to 
them, while they themselves would have lost their privileged positions in the 
companies. As Lambsdorf (2002) states, corrupted practices has worse welfare 





In this presentation we have attempted to explore constrains in real estate investments in 
Greece focusing on market transparency, by putting a public sector company opposite 
the Public Sector – essentially placing a mirror in from of the State. Our aim was, 
among other things, to stress the contradiction between the State’s professed goals for 
economic growth and the ways it attracts investors. The main conclusions are the 
following: 
 
Real estate investors interpret complicated regulatory burdens, lack of information and 
corruption as kinds of taxes, or major causes for extremely long and dangerous delays in 
the projects’ feasibility and implementation. This attitude often discourage their 
investments, consequently slowing down economic growth and tourism development in 
general, sometimes in some peripheral locations of the country that need investments to 
start their development process. 
 
It is not easy for the policies that the State professes it has for attracting private 
investors to develop when the State faces itself as an opponent. In point of fact, in an 
internationalized economy where capital and enterprises circulate without 
administrative barriers, the ability to attract investors depends to a large degree on the 
specific actions and policies of the State, within which the open market will operate. 
 
There are significant differences between the real estate market and other markets since 
real estate investment can be either a simple investment product or a productive factor 
in various economic activities, as is the case with tourism. In the latter case, the State 
institutions’ role is even more definitive since the business venture and the investors’ 
intention of investing in a specific financial sector of the country that may yield high 
investment returns may be hindered by factors concerning the real estate sector. 
Consequently, real estate market transparency improvement is the prerequisite for 
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